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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to study organized flocking behavior and sys-
temic risk in heterogeneous mean-field interacting diffusions. We illustrate
in a number of case studies the effect of heterogeneity in the behavior of
systemic risk in the system, i.e., the risk that several agents default simul-
taneously as a result of interconnections. We also investigate the effect
of heterogeneity on the ”flocking behavior” of different agents, i.e., when
agents with different dynamics end up following very similar paths and
follow closely the mean behavior of the system. Using Laplace asymp-
totics, we derive an asymptotic formula for the tail of the loss distribution
as the number of agents grows to infinity. This characterizes the tail of
the loss distribution and the effect of the heterogeneity of the network on
the tail loss probability.
1 Introduction
Systemic risk is the risk that a large number of components of an intercon-
nected system fail within a short time thus leading to the overall failure of
the system, see for example [Fouque and Langsam, 2013, Garnier et al., 2013b,
Spiliopoulos, 2015]. Flocking behavior refers to the phenomenon where all or
most of the components of a system follow more or less the same behavior, see
for example [Motsch and Tadmor, 2011]. The two phenomena, systemic risk
and flocking behavior, are of course different and describe different but, at the
same time, related issues. The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of
heterogeneity on systemic risk and flocking behavior in a system of interacting
diffusions.
In financial markets, for example, the combined effect of systemic risk and
flocking may mean that the majority of components in a pool goes to a default
state. In reliability, a large system of interacting components might have a
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central connection, crucial for normal operations of the system. The failure of
an individual component increases the stress on the central connection and thus
on the other components as well, making the entire system more likely to fail.
In insurance, the system could represent a pool of insurance policies.
We consider a stylized model of mean-field interacting diffusions:
dY
(i)
t = αi
 1
N
N∑
j=1
Y
(j)
t − Y (i)t
 dt+ σidW (i)t , i = 1, ..., N (1.1)
Model (1.1) is a simple enough model for mathematical analysis, yet able
to capture some of the main features of the effect of heterogeneity on systemic
risk and flocking behavior. Our goal in this paper is not to offer a sufficiently
sophisticated model, but rather to explain the phenomena that can be expected
within a reasonably rich but simple model. To induce heterogeneity, we as-
sume that not all αi’s and/or not all σi’s are equal. The interaction of different
agents, i.e., the different components of the system, is via the mean-field empiri-
cal average 1N
N∑
j=1
Y
(j)
t . Each W
(i)
t , i = 1, ..., N represents independent standard
Brownian motion. The diffusion coefficient σi’s represent the volatility corre-
sponding to agent i, and its size represent how stable the performance is for
agent i. The coefficient αi represent the level of influence from the whole sys-
tem on agent i. The dynamics (1.1) imply that agent i is attracted towards the
level Y¯t =
1
N
∑N
j=1 Y
(j)
t at time t.
For example, in a banking financial system, Y
(i)
t could represent the log-
monetary reserve of agent i at time t, see for example [Fouque and Ichiba, 2013].
The paper [Fouque and Sun, 2013] studies the system (1.1) in the homogeneous
case, i.e., when αi = α and σi = σ for every i = 1, ..., N . They find that along
increasing α’s, the behavior of each Y
(i)
t is closer to the behavior of the mean
Y¯t =
1
N
N∑
j=1
Y
(j)
t . This phenomenon leads to the so-called ”flocking effect”, where
all trajectories follow the same behavior in path space. The main conclusion of
[Fouque and Sun, 2013] is that large α enhances the ”flocking effect”, which may
either lead to a greater stability of the system or may increase the systemic risk
(i.e., increase the likelihood that a large number of components in the system
fail).
In our paper, we consider the heterogeneous case where not all αi’s or σi’s
are equal to each other. For a fixed default level η < 0, we use Laplace asymp-
totics to characterize the probability of the default event of the overall sys-
tem A :=
{
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y
(i)
t ≤ η
}
. We find that in the limit as N → ∞,
this probability is of the order of e
− η2N
2V 2
T , where V 2T depends on αi’s and σi’s
in a concrete way. Of courses in the case of αi = α and σi = σ, we re-
cover the formula V 2T = Tσ
2 as in [Fouque and Sun, 2013]. In addition, we
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obtain in certain cases of interest non-asymptotic bounds for the probability
P
(
sup0≤t≤T |Y (i)t − Y¯t| > δ
)
, demonstrating the effect of α’s and σ’s on the
flocking behavior. In addition, we explore numerically the behavior of Y
(i)
t and
the tail loss probability of the event A using Monte-Carlo simulation.
We are in particularly interested in the effect of heterogeneity and derive a
number of interesting conclusions (explained in detail in Sections 2 and 3):
(i) If αi = α for every i, then the larger σi’s are, the more volatile the system
is. As α gets larger, the ”flocking effect” becomes more apparent, but
larger σi’s naturally lead to deviation from the mean behavior.
(ii) If αi = α for every i, then V
2
T = Tσ
2
∗ = T lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
σ2i , which means
that the effect of heterogeneity in the behavior of the system is described
via the effective averaged diffusion σ2∗. This implies that larger σ
2
∗ leads
to larger probability of losses.
(iii) In the case of αi = α for every i, we obtain an exact bound for the
probability P
(
sup0≤t≤T |Y (i)t − Y¯t| > δ
)
, which demonstrates that flock-
ing behavior is controlled by a term of the form
f(σ21 ,··· ,σ2N )
α . This explains
why large values of α benefit strong flocking behavior and it also shows
the effect of the volatilities, as the function f takes an explicit form.
(iv) In the case of different αi’s and different σi’s, we find that the system is
more stable when the number of intermediate size agents is large enough,
i.e., the number of agents with moderate values of αi and σi is much larger
than the number of agents that have either small αi or large σi. This can
be thought of as an effect of the heterogeneity of the network (a complete
graph in the present case) that the agents constitute.
(v) At the same time, we find that the probability of all agents defaulting is
smaller in systems whose agents that have large αi also have relatively large
σi and correspondingly agents with small αi also have small volatility σi.
We also analyze the form of V 2T theoretically, which illustrates the effect
of the interaction of αi and σi.
(vi) Even seemingly small changes in the composition of the structure of the
population that the agents constitute, can have dramatic consequences as
far as organized flocking behavior and stability of the system are concerned.
Systemic risk in the financial system is a subject that has grown a lot in re-
cent years. We refer the reader to [Fouque and Langsam, 2013] for a general in-
troduction to the subject and to [Fouque and Ichiba, 2013, Garnier et al., 2013,
Garnier et al., 2013b, Giesecke et al., 2013, Spiliopoulos, 2015, Sowers and Spiliopoulos, 2015]
for studies on clustering, rare events and large deviations associated to systemic
risk in heterogeneous financial networks. In this paper we consider a stylized
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model. Our main goal is to study the effect of heterogeneity and of the struc-
ture of the system on flocking behavior and on systemic risk. We consider a
simple model that is amenable to analysis, but at the same time is rich enough
to capture different type of interesting behaviors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we investigate
the case of αi = α for every i but σi 6= σj for some i 6= j. We study the
effect of heterogeneity on the ”flocking effect” of Y
(i)
t and on the tail of the
default probability 1N
N∑
i=1
Y
(i)
t . In Section 3, we study the richer cases of αi 6=
αj and σi 6= σj for some i 6= j. We explore the situation both numerically
and theoretically, characterizing V 2T , which controls the tail of the average loss
distribution; this is Theorem 3.2. In this general case, the formula of V 2T is
complex even though it is in explicit form. To get a better understanding,
we derive an approximation of V 2T via Taylor expansion in the special case of
αi = α¯(1 + δci), 0 < δ  1 in terms of δ, this is Lemma 3.4. Of course when
δ = 0, we get back the simpler formula derived in Section 2. We conclude in
Section 4 with conclusions and future work.
2 Identical α’s but Different σ’s
We start by exploring how different volatilities affect the default probability of
the N agents. Thus, we assume that σi, i = 1, ..., N for each agent i are not
necessarily identical, but we assume that they all share the same mean reversion
parameter α. Thus, for all i = 1, ..., N equation (1.1) takes the form:
dY
(i)
t = α
 1
N
N∑
j=1
Y
(j)
t − Y (i)t
 dt+ σidW (i)t (2.1)
To understand the behavior of the tail default probability and of flocking, we
first focus on the behavior of ensemble average that reaches the default state.
Based on equation (2.1) and with the non-important assumption Y
(i)
0 = 0 ,
i = 1, ..., N , we get:
Y
(i)
t = α
∫ t
0
 1
N
N∑
j=1
Y (j)s − Y (i)s
 ds+ σiW (i)t
Hence we obtain
N∑
i=1
Y
(i)
t = α
∫ t
0
 N∑
j=1
Y (j)s −
N∑
i=1
Y (i)s
 ds+ N∑
i=1
σiW
(i)
t =
N∑
i=1
σiW
(i)
t (2.2)
Based on this relationship, we obtain the following by using the reflection prin-
ciple of Brownian motion:
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P(
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y
(i)
t ≤ η
)
= P
(
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
σiW
(i)
t ≤ η
)
= 2P

√∑N
i=1 σ
2
i
N
W˜T ≤ η
 = 2Φ
 Nη√
T
√∑N
i=1 σ
2
i

where W˜t denotes a standard Brownian motion at time t. Using Laplace asymp-
totics we get:
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y
(i)
t ≤ η
)
≈ 2 exp
{
− N
2η2
2T (
∑N
i=1 σ
2
i )
}
with η < 0. Thus, we have arrived at the following theorem
Theorem 2.1. Consider the diffusion processes Y
(i)
t for i = 1, ..., N as given
by (2.1). Let V 2T = Tσ
2
∗, where σ
2
∗ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
i=1 σ
2
i . Assume that σ
2
∗ exists
and is finite. Then, we have that
lim
N→∞
− 1
N
logP
(
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y
(i)
t ≤ η
)
=
η2
2V 2T
. (2.3)
Hence, if N is large enough, the following approximation holds:
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y
(i)
t ≤ η
)
≈ e−
Nη2
2Tσ2∗ (2.4)
From the equation above, if σ2∗ increases, the probability that the empirical
mean 1N
∑N
i=1 Y
(i)
t falls below η for some t ∈ [0, T ] will increase. This verifies the
intuition that the tail default probability increases as a function of 1N
∑N
i=1 σ
2
i .
Next, we turn to flocking behavior. In order to understand the flocking
behavior quantitatively, we need, for a given δ > 0, to control the probability
P
(
sup0≤t≤T |Y (i)t − Y¯t| > δ
)
.
Proposition 2.2. Consider the diffusion processes Y
(i)
t for i = 1, ..., N as given
by (2.1). Let κi =
√
(1− 1/N)2σ2i + (1/N2)
∑
j 6=i σ
2
j . Then, for any δ > 0, we
have that
P
(
sup
0≤t≤T
|Y (i)t − Y¯t| > δ
)
≤ 2 exp
{
− δ
2
κ2i
α (1− e−2αT )
}
(2.5)
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In particular, Proposition 2.2 shows that flocking behavior is controlled by
the ”flocking” parameter
F = max
i=1,··· ,N
κ2i
α
=
(1− 1/N)2 max
i=1,··· ,N
σ2i +
1
N2
∑
j 6=i
σ2j
α
which, shows that if α is large and σ′is are small, then the particles closely follow
in probability the behavior of the mean.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Based on (2.2), we have that R
(i)
t = Y
(i)
t − Y¯t satisfies
R
(i)
t = −α
∫ t
0
R(i)s ds+ σiW
(i)
t −
1
N
N∑
i=1
σiW
(i)
t
Due to the independence of the Wiener processes, W
(i)
t , i = 1, ..., N , we
obtain that there exists a Brownian motion W˜
(i,N)
t such that, in distribution
R
(i)
t = −α
∫ t
0
R(i)s ds+ κiW˜
(i,N)
t
Solving this SDE, we then obtain
R
(i)
t = κi
∫ t
0
e−α(t−s)dW˜ (i,N)s ∼ N
(
0,
κ2i
2α
(1− e−2αt)
)
Let λ > 0 be given, then we have, using the submartingale property of eλR
(i)
t :
P
(
sup
0≤t≤T
|R(i)t | > δ
)
≤ 2P
(
sup
0≤t≤T
R
(i)
t > δ
)
= 2P
(
sup
0≤t≤T
eλR
(i)
t > eλδ
)
≤ 2e−δλE[eλR(i)T ]
≤ 2e−δλ+λ
2
2
κ2i
2α (1−e−2αT )
Minimizing over λ we get the bound
P
(
sup
0≤t≤T
|R(i)t | > δ
)
≤ 2e−δ2(
κ2i
α (1−e−2αT ))
−1
concluding the proof of the Proposition.
3 Different α’s and Different σ’s
In this section, we study how the combination of different interactions and
different volatilities affect flocking behavior and the tail default probability dis-
tribution. We also study the effect of the structure of the system on its stability.
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3.1 Numerical simulations and motivation
To motivate the discussion, we first solve numerically (1.1) using the standard
Euler scheme. We plot two groups of trajectories of N agents to compare two
extreme situations: (i) Group A: agents with small αi’s have large σi’s while
agents with large αi’s have small σi’s; (ii) Group B: agents with small αi’s also
have small σi’s and agents with large αi’s also have large σi’s. That is, we design
two groups as follows:
Group A : {(α, σ){1,2}, (α, σ){3,4,5,6,7}, (α, σ){8,9,10}} = {(1, 2), (10, 1), (100, 0.5)}
Group B : {(α, σ){1,2}, (α, σ){3,4,5,6,7}, (α, σ){8,9,10}} = {(1, 0.5), (10, 1), (100, 2)}.
Sample trajectories and loss distribution are shown on Figure 1, Figure 3
and Figure 2, Figure 4 respectively. In both trajectories graphs, two light grey
lines are trajectories with (α, σ){1,2}; five dark grey lines are trajectories with
(α, σ){3,4,5,6,7}; and three black lines are trajectories with (α, σ){8,9,10}. The
solid horizontal line represents the default level η = −0.7 and the centered bold
red line represents the average trajectory.
We shall refer to tail default probability to be the probability that all agents
default.
Figure 1: Trajectories for Group A
{(1, 2), (10, 1), (100, 0.5)}
Figure 2: Trajectories for Group B
{(1, 0.5), (10, 1), (100, 2)}
Figure 3: Loss distribution with tail default
probability 0.261
Figure 4: Loss distribution with tail default
probability 0.012
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Remark 3.1. It is interesting to note that this seemingly small change in the
structure of the system has such a profound effect on its behavior and stability.
Moreover, we have the following observations
• Observation 1: From Figures 1 and 3, we see that agents that have: (i)
small αi’s, (ii) large σi’s, and (iii) small proportion of total number of
such agents, do not follow the mean behavior closely. However, their large
volatilities contribute significantly to the trend of the overall system (or,
average behavior). Other agents’ trajectories seem to follow the average
behavior. Meanwhile, the probability of all N agents defaulting is high.
• Observation 2: From Figures 2 and 4, we see that agents that have: (i)
large αi’s, and (ii) large σi’s follow the average behavior more closely, i.e.,
the “flocking effect” is more apparent. Furthermore, the probability of a
large default phenomenon to happen is relatively small.
Now we introduce the concept of stabilization which will be used in the
following part. Stabilization or stable behavior refers to the level of difficulty
for the system to go to a default state. That is, the more stable the system is,
the more difficult it is for the agents in the system to fail.
From [Fouque and Sun, 2013], we know that in the homogeneous case and
under reasonable value of σ’s, α’s dominate the stability of the system only
when α’s are large enough to cause a ”flocking behavior”. In this paper we see
that under reasonable range of σi’s, when αi’s are relatively large to σi’s, the
diffusion processes which have large αi’s will produce ”flocking effect” around
the average behavior. On the other hand, those that have large values of σi’s
but small value of αi’s will largely affect the stability of the system. Thus, the
whole system is easier to go to a default state, which is indicated by Observation
1. On the contrary, if small αi’s are combined with small σi’s and large αi’s are
combined with large σi’s, then the system is more stable, which is Observation
2.
From Section 2, we learn that the tail default probability is positively cor-
related with 1N
∑N
i=1 σ
2
i when σi’s are different but αi’s are the same. Now,
we take different σi’s and αi’s which may lead to more complicated behavior.
Therefore, we also conjecture that the composition of the system might also
affect the systemic risk.
Recall the two groups A and B, each one composed by three different sub-
groups:
Group A : {(α, σ)I , (α, σ)II , (α, σ)III} = {(1, 2), (10, 1), (100, 0.5)}
Group B : {(α, σ)I , (α, σ)II , (α, σ)III} = {(1, 0.5), (10, 1), (100, 2)} (3.1)
Consider two cases, Case A and Case B, for the ratios of agents of each type
within each group. Our goal is to investigate the effect of different structures
of the network on the tail default probability. In Case A, the ratios for agents
of type I, II and III are 8:1:1, 1:8:1 and 1:1:8 respectively. In Case B, the
corresponding ratios are 5:3:2, 2:5:3, 2:3:5.
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In the following trajectories figures for Case A, agents of type I, II and III
correspond to light grey lines, dark grey lines and black lines respectively. The
solid horizontal line represents the ”default level” η = −0.7 and the centered
bold red line represents the average trajectory.
Group A: {(α, σ)I , (α, σ)II , (α, σ)III = {(1, 2), (10, 1), (100, 0.5)}
Figure 5: Trajectories for
Ratio of Agents 8:1:1
Figure 6: Trajectories for
Ratio of Agents 1:8:1
Figure 7: Trajectories for
Ratio of Agents 1:1:8
Table 1: Loss Distribution of Group A for Different Proportion of Agents
number of defaulted
agents of type
(I: II: III)
0 6 7 8 9 10
(8 : 1 : 1) 0.000 0.192 0.168 0.117 0.114 0.078
(1 : 8 : 1) 0.204 0.036 0.029 0.032 0.046 0.203
(1 : 1 : 8) 0.274 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.019 0.405
(5 : 3 : 2) 0.001 0.058 0.054 0.029 0.118 0.152
(2 : 5 : 3) 0.098 0.029 0.020 0.022 0.039 0.261
(2 : 3 : 5) 0.074 0.007 0.010 0.016 0.039 0.296
From these graphs and Table 1, we obtain:
• Observation 3: From Figure 5 and Table 1, we see that the system which
possesses agents of subgroup I with the largest proportion seems unstable
but the tail default probability is the smallest compared to other groups.
• Observation 4: From Figure 6 and Table 1, we see that when agents of
subgroup II dominate the system, the system seems to be more stable
with strong ”flocking behavior” and less trajectories will reach the tail
default level. Furthermore, the tail default probability is intermediate in
all groups.
• Observation 5: From Figure 7 and Table 1, we see that when agents of
subgroup III dominate the system, then a strong ”flocking effect” exists
and tail default probability is the largest when compared to the two other
groups.
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Next, we also explore what happens when we change the composition of
the network. In particular we explore Group B, given by (3.1). Note that by
Observations 1 and 2, we expect that in this case the overall default probability
will be smaller than that of Group A.
Group B: {(α, σ)I , (α, σ)II , (α, σ)III = {(1, 0.5), (10, 1), (100, 2)}
Figure 8: Trajectories for
Ratio of Agents 8:1:1
Figure 9: Trajectories for
Ratio of Agents 1:8:1
Figure 10: Trajectories for
Ratio of Agents 1:1:8
Table 2: Loss Distribution of Group B for Different Proportion of Agents
number of defaulted
agents of type
(I: II: III)
0 6 7 8 9 10
(8 : 1 : 1) 0.524 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(1 : 8 : 1) 0.460 0.035 0.032 0.031 0.023 0.016
(1 : 1 : 8) 0.483 0.029 0.019 0.031 0.106 0.096
(5 : 3 : 2) 0.510 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.001 0.001
(2 : 5 : 3) 0.489 0.024 0.024 0.028 0.032 0.008
(2 : 3 : 5) 0.516 0.027 0.031 0.030 0.040 0.011
From these graphs and Table 2, we observe:
• Observation 7: From Figure 8 and Table 2, we see that the system dom-
inated by agents of subgroup I has weak ”flocking behavior” and less
variability. It produces the smallest tail default probability compared to
the other two types of networks.
• Observation 8: From Figure 9 and Table 2, we see that when the agents
of subgroup II compose the largest proportion of the system, the system
seems to be more stable with the combination of moderate ”flocking effect”
and variability. Furthermore, the tail default probability has intermediate
value when compared to the other two cases.
• Observation 9: From Figure 10 and Table 2, when agents of subgroup
III dominate the system, the system is relatively unstable. The large α’s
produce a strong ”flocking behavior” leading the system to overall higher
tail default probability.
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3.2 Theoretical investigation
In order to understand theoretically the behavior of the tail default probability,
we need to understand analytically the probability
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y
(i)
t ≤ η
)
.
To simplify some of the computations we assume that Y
(i)
0 = 0, for i =
1, ..., N . Furthermore, we want to generalize it to finite agents maintaining
different σi’s and αi’s. We divide the N agents into K < N groups with distinct
(α˜k, σ˜k) for k = 1, ...,K, K is fixed, and we use Ik for k’th group where
Ik = {j ∈ {1, ..., N} : (αj , σj) = (α˜k, σ˜k)}
Namely, within each group the agents are homogeneous. We use Y¯t
k
to
denote partial empirical averages and Y¯t for overall empirical average. Also, ρk
denotes the percentage of agents that belong to the k’th group. Based on the
definition,
Y¯t
k
=
1
|Ik|
∑
j∈Ik
Y
(j)
t , where ρk =
|Ik|
N
and k = 1, ...,K
Y¯t =
N∑
i=1
Y
(i)
t
N
=
K∑
k=1
ρkY¯t
k
Therefore, we obtain for the partial average of the kth group:
Y¯t
k
=
1
|Ik|
∑
i∈Ik
Y
(i)
t =
1
|Ik|
∑
i∈Ik
[
αk
∫ t
0
(Y¯s − Y (i)s )ds+ σkW (i)t
]
= αk
∫ t
0
(
Y¯s − 1|Ik|
∑
i∈Ik
Y (i)s
)
ds+ σk
1
|Ik|
∑
i∈Ik
W
(i)
t
= αk
∫ t
0
(
Y¯s − Y¯sk
)
ds+
σk√
ρkN
W˜t
k
where W˜t
k
, k = 1, ...,K are independent standard Brownian motions. Thus,
dY¯t
k
= αk(Y¯t − Y¯tk)dt+ σk√
ρkN
dW˜t
k
=
αk(ρk − 1)Y¯tk + αk K∑
i=1,i6=k
ρiY¯ it
 dt+ 1√
ρkN
σ2k
dW˜t
k
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Now we write the system in matrix form with column vector y¯t = (Y¯t
k
)k=1...K
and w˜t = (W˜t
k
)k=1...K :
dy¯t = My¯tdt+
1√
N
R−1/2dw˜t
where
Mij = −αi(δij − ρj), Rij = ρiσ−2i δij
with
δij =
{
1, i = j
0, i 6= j i, j = 1, ...,K.
By Itoˆ stochastic integration, see for example [Karatzas and Shreve, 2000], the
explicit solution to this system is:
y¯t = e
Mty¯0 +
1√
N
∫ t
0
eM(t−s)R(−1/2)dw˜s
Therefore,
Y¯t = %
T y¯t =
1√
N
%T
∫ t
0
eM(t−s)R(−1/2)dw˜s
and we get that in distribution,
Y¯t ∼ N
(
0 ,
1
N
V 2T
)
where
V 2t =
∫ t
0
%T eMsR−1(eMs)T %ds, % = (ρk)k=1,...,K . (3.2)
Next, we focus on the ensemble average which reaches the default level at
time T. Let W ∗t ∼ N
(
0 , 1N V
2
t
)
. The default probability is:
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y
(i)
t ≤ η
)
= P
(
min
0≤t≤T
W ∗t ≤ η
)
= 2P (WT
∗ ≤ η)
= 2P
(
1√
N
VT W˜ ≤ η
)
= 2Φ
(
η
√
N
VT
)
Where W˜ ∼ N(0, 1). Then using Laplace asymptotics, we obtain:
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y
(i)
t ≤ η
)
≈ 2 exp
{
−η
2N
2V 2T
}
(3.3)
Therefore, we have obtained the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.2. Consider the full heterogeneous case studied in this section. We
have
lim
N→∞
− 1
N
logP
(
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y
(i)
t ≤ η
)
=
η2
2V 2T
(3.4)
where V 2T is given by (3.2), provided that V
2
T <∞.
Let us check the accuracy of the approximation (3.3) choosing the groups
8 : 1 : 1 and 2 : 5 : 3 as in Table 1. The number of simulations is limited
to M = 500 due to computational resources and {(α, σ)I , (α, σ)II , (α, σ)III} =
{(1, 2), (10, 1), (100, 0.5)}.
We compute − 1N logP (A) by simulation and we compare with the asymp-
totic value η
2
2V 2T
as shown as in the following graphs:
Figure 11: Comparison between
− 1
N
logP (A) and η
2
2V 2
T
for Group A
with Ratio 8:1:1
Figure 12: Comparison between
− 1
N
logP (A) and η
2
2V 2
T
for Group A
with Ratio 2:5:3
Based on the graphs 11 and 12, we observe that − 1N logP (A) converges rel-
atively fast to η
2
2V 2T
with increasing N , which guarantees the accuracy of (3.3).
Of course due to the logarithmic limit of Theorem 3.2, one is loosing the pref-
actor information in this approximation, see Section 4 for more discussion on
this issue.
In the case K = 2, we can obtain an explicit formula for V 2T , which seems
to be a much harder task when K ≥ 3. For this purpose we have Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.3. Consider the setting of the Theorem 3.2 for K=2. Then, with
γ = α2ρ1 + α1ρ2, we have
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V 2T =
σ21ρ1
γ2
[
α22T +
ρ22 (α1 − α2)2
2γ
(
1− e−2γT )+ 2α2ρ2 (α1 − α2)
γ
(
1− e−γT )]
+
σ22ρ2
γ2
[
α21T +
ρ21 (α1 − α2)2
2γ
(
1− e−2γT )+ 2α1ρ1 (α2 − α1)
γ
(
1− e−γT )]
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Notice that we can view the matrix M as the infinitesimal
generator of a continuous time Markov chain with two states. Let P (t) = eMt
be the transition probability matrix of such a Markov chain. Then, it is known
that if we set c = α1ρ2 and d = α2ρ1,
P (t) =
[ d
c+d +
c
c+de
−(c+d)t c
c+d − cc+de−(c+d)t
d
c+d − dc+de−(c+d)t cc+d + dc+de−(c+d)t
]
Plugging the expression in the integrand of V 2T and doing the algebra we get
%T eMsR−1(eMs)T % =
σ21ρ1
γ2
(
α2 + ρ2 (α1 − α2) e−γs
)2
+
σ22ρ2
γ2
(
α1 + ρ1 (α2 − α1) e−γs
)2
.
By integrating this we get the expression of the lemma.
In the case K ≥ 3, an explicit formula seems to be quite hard to derive.
We would need the spectral decomposition for M . For this reason we derive an
approximation to V 2T in the case where the α
′
is are not too different from each
other. In particular, we assume that each group differs from another one by the
rate δci where ci is a bounded real constant, ci 6= cj for i 6= j and 0 < δ  1.
That is:
αk = α¯(1 + δck)
where α¯ =
K∑
i=1
ρiαi =
N∑
i=1
αi
/
N . Let us set
Vˆ 2T (δ) = T
K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i + 2δ
(
1
α¯
− T − e
−α¯T
α¯
) K∑
i=1
ρiciσ
2
i
+δ2
(
− 11
2α¯
+ 3T +
6 + 2T α¯
α¯
e−α¯T − 1
2α¯
e−2α¯T
) K∑
i=1
ρic
2
iσ
2
i
−2δ2
(
− 2
α¯
+ T +
2
α¯
e−α¯T + Te−α¯T
)( K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i
K∑
i=1
ρic
2
i
) (3.5)
Notice that if δ is small enough so that we can ignore the O(δ2) terms, then
large α¯ will also imply smaller Vˆ 2T (δ). Then, we have the following lemma, whose
proof is in the Appendix.
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Lemma 3.4. Let V 2T be given by (3.2) and Vˆ
2
T (δ) be given by (3.5). Then, as
δ ↓ 0, we have the error bound |V 2T − Vˆ 2T (δ)| ≤ Kδ3 +O(δ4) where K > 0.
Notice that if δ = 0 then (3.5) gives back the formulas of Section 2. Next,
we check numerically the accuracy of the approximation of (3.5). We firstly
compare the difference of V 2T and Vˆ
2
T .
Table 3: Comparison of V 2T and Vˆ
2
T
Common parameters:
δ = 0.001, ck = (−60, 0, 40), σ = (5, 2, 1), ρ = (0.2, 0.5, 0.3), M = 500, T = 1
α¯ α V 2T VˆT
2 |Vˆ 2T−V 2T |
V 2T
10 (9.4,10,10.4) 7.341 7.850 6.9%
50 (47,50,52) 7.401 7.901 6.7%
100 (94,100,104) 7.409 7.907 6.7%
Secondly, we verify the accuracy of (3.5) by comparing − 1N logP (A) to the
approximating value η
2
2Vˆ 2T
for groups with α¯ = 10, 50, 100.
Figure 13: Comparison
between − 1
N
logP (A) and
η2
2Vˆ 2
T
under α¯ = 10
Figure 14: Comparison
between − 1
N
logP (A) and
η2
2Vˆ 2
T
under α¯ = 50
Figure 15: Comparison
between − 1
N
logP (A) and
η2
2Vˆ 2
T
under α¯ = 100
From graphs 13, 14 and 15, we see that even with a moderate size of N , the
large deviations approximation of − 1N logP (A) is reasonably close to η
2
2Vˆ 2T
.
4 Conclusions and future work
This note mainly analyzes the effect of different mean-reversion rates αi’s and
volatilities σi’s on systemic risk and flocking behavior. In the model, we use a
mean-reversion part to represent the effect of the system to a specific diffusion
process and a random part for individual activity. We consider different combi-
nations of (αi,σi) to stretch out heterogeneity effects. Based on our model, we
explore numerically the properties of the tail default probability and compute
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the exact form of it for the mean behavior. In the specific case where all the
αi’s are the same, but the σi’s are different, we find that
1
N
∑N
i=1 σ
2
i influences
the systemic risk positively, but the ”flocking effect” resulting from αi’s will also
increase the system risk.
In the general case that has different αi’s and σi’s, the situation is far richer.
Systemic risk and flocking behavior are significantly affected by the size of αi’s
and σi’s and on how they are combined, see Observations 1-9 in Section 3.1.
We also find that when the majority of agents are of moderate size, in that the
corresponding parameters for the coefficients αi and σi are neither too large nor
too small, the system is more stable. In this case there is a flocking behavior
and the tail probability of many agents defaulting is not large.
It is clear that this paper raises open questions. We list some of them below.
1. It is clear that the brute force Monte Carlo approximation to − 1N logP (A)
is quite inefficient. As P (A) is a rare event, one would like to develop
related accelerated Monte Carlo methods, such as importance sampling.
2. Flocking effect and stabilization of the system are issues that need to be
better understood and better quantified. Can one quantify, in even more
explicit terms than we did in this paper, what is the effect of the inter-
connections of the system that the agents constitute on flocking behavior?
This paper is a first study towards this direction.
3. The model that we studied in this paper is a stylistic model and our goal
is to illustrate some of the issues. Analysis of more general models such
as the ones appearing in [Fouque and Ichiba, 2013, Garnier et al., 2013,
Giesecke et al., 2013, Sowers and Spiliopoulos, 2015] are of interest.
We plan to study these questions in future works.
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Appendix
In the appendix we prove Lemma 3.4. In order to obtain the expansion of V 2T
with respect to δ, we first obtain an expansion of %T eMt. Based on the form
of M, we rewrite it as M = −α¯M¯ − δα¯N . Here M¯ = I − µ%T where µ is the
K-dimensional column vector with each component 1 and N = ci(δij−ρj), i, j =
1, ...,K. Therefore
eMt =
∞∑
n=0
(−α¯t)n
n!
(M¯ + δN)n
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We focus on Taylor expansion with respect to δ  1. Note the five facts
K∑
i=1
ρi = 1, M¯
n = M¯ , M¯T % = 0 ·µ, M¯TNT % = NT % and M¯T (NT )2% = (NT )2%.
Below we first present the coefficients of the Taylor expansion of V 2T with respect
to δ up to second order.
For the zeroth order, i.e. for O(δ0) = O(1), the coefficient is:
%T
∞∑
n=0
(−α¯t)n
n!
M¯n =
∞∑
n=0
(−α¯t)n
n!
%T M¯ = %T
For the first order, i.e, for O(δ1), the coefficient is:
%T
∞∑
n=1
(−α¯t)n
n!
δNM¯n−1 =
∞∑
n=1
(−α¯t)n
n!
δ%TNM¯n−1
= δ
[−α¯t
1!
%TN + (e−α¯t − 1 + α¯t
1!
)%TNM¯
]
= δ(e−α¯t − 1)%TN
For the second order, i.e., for O(δ2), the coefficient is:
%T
{
(−α¯t)2
2!
(δN)2 +
∞∑
n=3
(−α¯t)n
n!
[
δ2NM¯n−2N + (δN)2M¯n−2 + (n− 3)δ2(NM¯)2]}
= %T
{
(−α¯t)2
2!
(δN)2 +
∞∑
n=3
(−α¯t)n
n!
[
δ2N2 + (δN)2 + (n− 3)δ2N2]}
= %T δ2
[ ∞∑
n=2
(−α¯t)n
n!
(n− 1)N2
]
= %T δ2
[
(−α¯t)
∞∑
n=2
(−α¯t)n−1
(n− 1)! N
2 −
∞∑
n=2
(−α¯t)n
n!
N2
]
= %T δ2
[
(−α¯t)(e−α¯t − 1)− (e−α¯t − 1 + α¯t)]N2
= δ2%T
(
1− e−α¯t − α¯te−α¯t)N2
Finally, we get the result
%T eMt = %T + δ(e−α¯t − 1)%TN + δ2(1− e−α¯t − α¯te−α¯t)%TN2 +O(δ3)
Therefore, we have
%T eMtR−1(%T eMt)T = %TR−1%+ δ(e−α¯t − 1) (%TR−1NT %+ %TNR−1%)
+δ2(1− e−α¯t − α¯te−α¯t)(%TR−1(NT )2%+ %TN2R−1%)
+δ2(e−α¯t − 1)2%TNR−1NT %+O(δ3)3
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Then we can simplify as follows
%T eMtR−1(%T eMt)T = %TR−1%+ 2δ(e−α¯t − 1)%TNR−1%
+2δ2(1− e−α¯t − α¯te−α¯t)%TN2R−1%
+δ2(e−α¯t − 1)2%TNR−1NT %+O(δ3)
Noting now the two important facts that (%TN)1j = ρjcj − ρj
K∑
i=1
ρici and
(NR−1%)j1 = cjσ2j − cj
K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i , j = 1, ...,K, we finally obtain:
%TR−1% =
K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i
%TNR−1% =
K∑
i=1
ρiciσ
2
i −
K∑
i=1
ρici
K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i
%TN2R−1% =
K∑
i=1
ρic
2
iσ
2
i −
K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i
K∑
i=1
ρic
2
i −
K∑
i=1
ρici
K∑
i=1
ρiciσ
2
i +
K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i
(
K∑
i=1
ρici
)2
%TNR−1NT % =
K∑
i=1
ρic
2
iσ
2
i − 2
K∑
i=1
ρici
K∑
i=1
ρiciσ
2
i +
K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i
(
K∑
i=1
ρici
)2
Now, we set
A =
K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i
B = 2δ
(
K∑
i=1
ρiciσ
2
i −
K∑
i=1
ρici
K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i
)
C = 2δ2
 K∑
i=1
ρic
2
iσ
2
i −
K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i
K∑
i=1
ρic
2
i −
K∑
i=1
ρici
K∑
i=1
ρiciσ
2
i +
K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i
(
K∑
i=1
ρici
)2
D = δ2
[
K∑
i=1
ρic
2
iσ
2
i − 2
K∑
i=1
ρici
K∑
i=1
ρiciσ
2
i +
K∑
i=1
ρiσ
2
i
(
K∑
i=1
ρici
)2]
Consequently, we get ∫ T
0
%T eMsR−1(%T eMs)T ds
3Note that we omit O(δ3) terms in this equation.
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=∫ T
0
[
A+B(e−α¯s − 1) + C(1− e−α¯s − α¯se−α¯s) +D(e−2α¯s + 1− 2e−α¯s)] ds
Based on this, we get the approximation:
V 2T =
∫ T
0
%T eMsR−1(eMs)T %ds
≈
[
1
2α¯
(2B − 4C − 3D) + (A−B + C +D)T + (2C
α¯
+ CT − B
α¯
+
2D
α¯
)e−α¯T − D
2α¯
e−2α¯T
]
= Vˆ 2T (δ)
Then, with
αk = α¯(1 + δck)
we find that
α¯ =
K∑
i=1
ρiαi =
K∑
i=1
ρiα¯(1 + δci) = α¯+ δα¯
K∑
i=1
ρici
where α¯ > 0, δ > 0. Equivalently, we have obtained
∑K
i=1 ρici = 0. Plugging
the latter expression in A,B,C,D and using
∑K
i=1 ρici = 0, we conclude the proof
of the lemma.
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